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ABSTRACT 
 Over the past century, women have been increasingly integrated and utilized 
within terrorist organizations. This thesis analyzes Boko Haram as a case study and 
examines the unique roles that women hold within it, focusing on the voluntary and 
involuntary motivations women participants use to justify their activity within the 
extremist organization. It examines the new ways in which female insurgents are being 
integrated into the organization and how this increased involvement, particularly as 
suicide bombers, lends to the effectiveness of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. To 
conclude, this thesis discusses the measures that both the Nigerian and U.S. governments 
must take in order to help effectively combat Boko Haram. The measures taken must 
integrate women into the foundation of restructured government institutions in order for 
equality and education across religious and gender lines to be reached. Through this 
process, the root grievances of the Nigerian people and Boko Haram insurgency are 
addressed and eradication of the organization is made possible. 
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To assume that violence is not a feminine characteristic and that women 
are not capable of mass murder has obvious appeal: it allows for hope that 
at least half the human race will not devour the other, that it will protect 
children and so safeguard the future. 
 —Wendy Lower1 
When the discussion of terrorism comes up, most people do not immediately 
visualize a woman as the perpetrator. This presumption may owe to a preconceived 
feminine identity, that characterizes women as mothers, sisters, wives, friends—and 
inherently non-violent and passive. Yet over the past century, women have been 
increasingly integrated and utilized within terrorist organizations.2 Since the early 1960s, 
this increased female involvement in terrorist organizations has sparked an increase in 
academic interest in the motivations, integration, and psychology behind women’s roles 
in these organizations. In turn, new insights are emerging; for example, women are not 
simply being coerced into participation, but they are voluntarily seeking out more and 
more violent roles.3 For another example, since the first reported case of a Boko Haram 
female suicide bomber on June 8, 2014, the rate of female suicide bombers has steadily 
increased, and women have now become the preferred gender for suicide bombings 
carried out by this terrorist organization.4  
With the evolution of modern conflict, women have been increasingly integrated 
into all aspects of terrorism. This thesis analyzes Boko Haram as a case study of the 
unique roles that women hold within it, focusing on the voluntary and involuntary 
                                                 
1 Wendy Lower, Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields, Reprint (Wilmington, 
MA: Mariner Books, 2014), 158. 
2 Katherine Lindemann, “Female Terrorists - A Surprisingly Timeless Phenomenon,” Researchgate 
(blog), December 21, 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/blog/post/female-terrorists-a-surprisingly-
timeless-phenomenon. 
3 Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011), 233. 
4 Ania Skinner, “The Rising Trend of Female Suicide Bombers in Nigeria,” The Fund for Peace - 
Global Square (blog), March 28, 2015, http://library.fundforpeace.org/blog-20150328-
nigeriawomenbombers. 
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motivations women participants use to justify their activity within the extremist 
organization.5 It examines the new ways in which female insurgents are being integrated 
into the organization, and how this increased involvement, particularly as suicide 
bombers, lends to the effectiveness of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization. Through 
this analysis, it can be understood how Boko Haram’s tactics and utilization of women 
differs from its cross-regional counterparts and how this organization must be approached 
by the international community differently than its extremist counterparts in order to fully 
combat and eradicate it from the Lake Chad region. 
In addition, the thesis addresses the following questions: Are there unique 
recruitment tactics that Boko Haram—compared to other contemporary extremist 
organizations—is implementing to control its female martyrs? Are the themes and 
trends—such as the kidnapping and torture of Christian women—that are being observed 
within the Boko Haram organization congruent with or similar to cross-regional 
narratives of extremist organizations located in differing regions and cultures? 
Additionally, how might the international community use this information to combat 
Boko Haram more effectively?  
A. OVERVIEW OF BOKO HARAM 
The terrorist organization, Jama’a Ahl as-Sunna Lida’wa wa-al Jihad, which is 
translated to “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and 
Jihad” and is more commonly referred to and recognized as Boko Haram, has actively 
opposed the influence of Western culture and education in northern Nigeria, Cameroon, 
Niger, and Mali.6 In November 2013, the United States declared Boko Haram a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO).7 As defined by the United States Immigration and 
                                                 
5 The term “terrorist organization” and “extremist organization” will be used interchangeably 
throughout this literature. 
6 Patricio Asfura-Heim and Julia McQuaid, “Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, 
Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria,” CNA Analysis & Solutions, January 2015, 
xiii. 
7 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed August 6, 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
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Nationality Act, FTOs are foreign organizations who engage in terrorist activity that 
actively endanger U.S. citizens or U.S. national security.8  
Established in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram was a relatively peaceful 
movement comprised primarily of Kanuri people who aspired to bring Islamic ideologies 
and religiously based government institutions to the people of northern Nigeria, as they 
felt that their ethnic group was being economically repressed by the Nigerian 
government. After a violent altercation with police in 2009 in which Yusuf was killed, 
Boko Haram took a one-year hiatus to regroup and reemerge with the mission of revenge. 
Since then, Boko Haram has gained notoriety for its kidnapping of Christian women and 
children throughout northern Nigeria and its use of women in suicide operations.9  
In order to understand how to combat this new wave of fighters within this 
organization, one must understand the motivations of these women as well as the 
different ways in which they have been integrated into the Boko Haram insurgency. This 
insight, in comparison with historical cases of female insurgents throughout three other 
FTOs located in different regions around the world, will provide a cross-regional analysis 
of four extremist Islamic organizations. All of these organizations vary considerably on 
the cultural scale due to their geographic location, or global presence, and consequently 
how they organize their FTOs in regards to the utilization of their women. Boko Haram, 
for example, has utilized women in a combative role since its resurgence in 2009, just as 
the Chechen Black Widows did, whereas Al-Qaeda and the Afghani Taliban were much 
slower to integrate women into both supporting and combative roles. These three cross-
regional FTOs have been analyzed and provide valuable insight into an underrated but 
integral part of terrorist organizations, thus contributing to the larger road map of how to 
most effectively restore peace and stability to northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and 
Mali.  
                                                 
8 Department of Homeland Security, “Immigration and Nationality Act: Section 219,” 8 USC § 1189 
(2001), https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-5017.html#0-0-0-
220. 
9 “Mapping Militant Organizations: Boko Haram,” Stanford University, CISAC, August 26, 2016, 1–
2, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553?highlight=boko+haram. 
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B. WOMEN IN TERRORISM: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on the stereotypical Western image of terrorists, it is a common 
misperception that women are not acting of their own accord when they participate in 
these extremist organizations. According to some, the concept of women as terrorists is 
disturbing, foreign and not a concept that generally fits the Western narrative and gender 
constructs that label women as nurturers and the passive, non-violent sex.10 Mia Bloom 
explains that “many people have assumed that women could not consciously choose to 
participate in terrorism of their own volition. The underlying assumption is that a man 
made her do it.”11 This assumption though, contradicts the active participation and 
voluntary service that women have provided throughout history within terrorist 
organizations. The mobilization and value of women in both leadership and support 
positions have increased considerably along with the number of female suicide bombers 
in recent years. Thus, it is imperative that U.S. military leaders have a fuller 
understanding of the current and growing threat that these women pose to national 
security and international peace. This literature review explores why, in general, various 
terrorist organizations globally utilize women, how women become participants, as well 
as what roles women are filling and the contributions they are making to these FTOs. 
Although “terrorism” is one of the most widely used words in both 
international relations and the news media, the word lacks a clear, 
universal definition. Those who try to characterize it often harbor 
underlying biases (rendering their definitions questionable), or, in the case 
of some governments and the media, they may seek to label as many 
events as possible with a provocative term to demonize a particular group 
or to create headlines.12 
Nonetheless, the term “terrorism” must be defined for the purpose of this thesis. 
Author Walter Laqueur observed that the earliest definition can be traced to the 
                                                 
10 R. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs, First 
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009), 1. 
11 Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011), ix. 
12 Ellie B. Hearne, “Participants, Enablers, and Preventers: The Roles of Women in Terrorism,” in 
British International Studies Association Annual Conference (Leicaster, UK, 2009), 2, https://is.muni.cz/el/
1423/jaro2010/MVZ203/Gender___Terrorism__BISA__Hearne__Dec_2009.pdf. 
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Dictionnaire of the Académie Française, which defined the term terrorism as “système, 
régime de la terreur,”13 thus claiming that even in its earliest form, the term “implied 
political upheaval, chaos, and violence.”14 This background leads to the modern 
understanding of the three recognized characteristics of terrorism—”violent tactics, 
nonstate actors, and political objectives.”15 For the purpose of this thesis, the definition 
given by Brian Michael Jenkins—that “terrorism may properly refer to a specific set of 
actions the primary intent of which is to produce fear and alarm that may serve a variety 
of purposes”—will be sufficient as it has built on the Académie Française definition and 
is constructed for modern terrorism.16  
1. Why Use Women? 
Terrorist organizations are rational actors that calculate the tactical purpose and 
strategic value of every action. The rise in the use of female operatives throughout 
extremist organizations can be seen as a shift in strategy both politically and tactically.17 
The traditional societal roles that women play—wife, mother, and nurturer—can be used 
both for and against extremist organizations. The path that women will take and the roles 
they come to play rely heavily on the women’s circumstances upon first contact with the 
organization. Whether these women are widows, survivors of gender-based violence, or 
refugees has a large impact on how vulnerable they are to being coerced into subscribing 
to extremist ideology and enlisting in terrorist organizations. 
The first major reason for the recruitment of women into extremist organizations 
is that women are much more capable of mobilizing support between both genders.18 
Women are generally able to attract more people to their organization than their male 
                                                 
13 Cragin and Daly, Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs, 7. 
14 Cragin and Daly, 7. 
15 Cragin and Daly, 7. 
16 Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems” (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, December 1980), 2, http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA103363. 
17 Katharina Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, 
no. 5 (2007): 400–401, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701258585. 
18 Von Knop, 401. 
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counterparts as they are seen as softer personalities, which allows them to appear more 
trustworthy when engaging with the population and recruiting new extremists. Women 
are also sought after to serve as incentive for male recruits, by fulfilling the sexual and 
domestic roles and duties of (ideologically committed) wives.19  
Female terrorists are being idolized within their communities and seen as strong 
role models for other women, as well as shaming of men into enlistment.20 Von Knop 
explains that “following the first female Palestinian suicide attack in January 2002, the 
Egyptian Islamist weekly newspaper Al-Sha’ab taunted, ‘It is a woman, a woman, a 
woman who is a source of pride for the women of this nation and a source of honor that 
shames the submissive men with a shame that cannot be washed away except by 
blood.’”21 By challenging men’s masculinity, and giving them the chance to prove that 
they are “real men,” extremist organizations are able to keep enlistment numbers rising. 
The enlistment of women and their use of shaming men into enlistment is a very popular 
tactic in ensuring the survival of the extremist organization when recruitment is low.22  
Women also tend to attract widespread publicity, which then allows their 
organization to disseminate its message to a larger audience.23 Bloom states that, “attacks 
are done for effect, and the more dramatic the effect, the stronger the message; thus a 
potential interest on the part of some groups in recruiting women.”24 By using women 
within their ranks, extremist organizations are able to gain media attention from around 
the world, which allows them to spread their message and stir up reactions from a larger 
audience. By gaining publicity, extremist organizations gain legitimacy, and by gaining 
legitimacy they are able to survive—even if their women members do not.  
                                                 
19 International Crisis Group, Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency (Brussels, Belgium: 
International Crisis Group, 2016), 6, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-women-
and-boko-haram-insurgency. 
20 Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” 401. 
21 Von Knop, 401. 
22 Von Knop, 401. 
23 Von Knop, 401. 
24 Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism, 22. 
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Indeed, women are being used for their effectiveness in carrying out missions. 
Bloom states that, “the underlying message conveyed by female bombers is: terrorism is 
no longer a fringe phenomenon and the insurgents are all around you.”25 Women are 
much more successful than men when it comes to kill rate and completion of bombing. 
“[Women are] the ultimate asymmetric weapon,”26 says Magnus Ranstorp, the director 
of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. By using women in 
suicide campaigns, they can more easily avoid being caught by soldiers and security 
personnel as they do not fit the profiles and stereotypes of a terrorist that these forces are 
on the lookout for.27 Many women in extremist organizations are able to conceal 
explosives around their mid-section in the disguise of a late-term pregnancy.28 This tactic 
for concealing explosives allows them to bypass security personnel more effectively and 
blend in with the population, their target. Though accurate statistics are not available, as 
data collection on bombers and casualties is continually changing, the reasons behind 
using women as suicide bombers are known. 
Finally, terrorist organizations use the capture and in some cases abuse of women 
to seek revenge and gain leverage over opponents, proving to the organization’s 
opponents that they are unable to protect their women, thus also striking at their 
masculinity.29 This tactic is particularly employed within the Boko Haram organization, 
which carried out its first kidnapping operation in February of 2013 with the sole purpose 
of retaliating against government officials.30 
                                                 
25 Bloom, 24. 
26 Debra D. Zedalis, “Female Suicide Bombers” (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2004), 7, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub408.pdf. 
27 Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism, 20. 
28 Bloom, 21–22. 
29 Jacob Zenn and Elizabeth Pearson, “Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram,” 
Journal of Terrorism Research 5, no. 1 (February 2014): 47–51, https://doi.org/10.15664. 
30 Zenn and Pearson, 47. 
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2. How Do Women Contribute?  
The historical roles of women within extremist organizations are categorized into 
six functional roles by Kim Cragin and Sara Daly as: logisticians, recruiters, martyrs, 
operational leaders, guerrillas, and political vanguard.31 These roles have been 
categorized by other academics as: preventers and enablers; supporters and perpetrators; 
and sympathizers, spies, warriors, and leaders.32  
Cragin and Daly note that “logistics relate to the ‘procurement, maintenance, and 
transportation of military material, facilities, and personnel; the handling of the details of 
an operation.’ For terrorist or insurgent groups, logisticians smuggle weapons and funds 
to terrorist leaders and their operational cells.”33 As Cragin and Daly explain, women 
recruiters are “individuals used or designated by terrorist leaders to attract new 
logisticians, financiers, suicide bombers, or guerrilla fighters into their organization. 
Recruiters also often serve as essential linkages between a terrorist or insurgent group 
and popular support communities.”34 Though female political vanguards tend to be rare 
within terrorist organizations, they do exist. Cragin and Daly identify a few as “Kesire 
Yildirim from the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), … Bernadette Sands-McKevitt 
from the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) in Northern Ireland; Comandante Ramona 
from the Zapatista Revolutionary Army … in Mexico; … and even Fusako Sigenobu 
from the Japanese Red Army (JRA).”35 Women tend to fall within three different 
categories of political vanguard: the strategic visionaries, who are women that 
revolutionize the ideology and strategy of a terrorist organization; the central committee 
members, who are women that participate in decision-making bodies within the 
organization; and finally the political officials, who have been elected to civilian 
                                                 
31 Cragin and Daly, Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs, 105. 
32 Hearne, “Participants, Enablers, and Preventers: The Roles of Women in Terrorism,” 3. 
33 Cragin and Daly, Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs, 21. 
34 Cragin and Daly, 39. 
35 Cragin and Daly, 87. 
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legislatures and are able to voice the opinions and needs of the terrorist organization to 
which they belong.36  
Women have increasingly served in roles that directly put them within the line of 
fire or in positions where they are committing acts of violence against others. Boko 
Haram started to utilize women in suicide missions in 2011, with the younger women 
suspected of being forced into participation and the elder women of volunteering.37 
According to Von Knop, “suicide bombers provide a low-cost, low-technology, low-risk 
weapon that maximizes target destruction and instills fear—women are even more 
effective with their increased accessibility and media shock value.”38 Women hold 
incredible value to terrorist organizations as suicide bombers, which is why this trend is 
seemingly on the rise, not just in Boko Haram, but globally.  
Regardless of motivations or integration though, it is evident that female 
involvement in terrorist organizations can no longer be put on the sideline when 
evaluating courses of action. Women are more essential to terrorist organizations than 
ever before. As Bloom conclusively states, “leaders of terrorist movements routinely 
make cost-benefit calculations to select the most effective tactics, targets, and operatives. 
Their analysis has shown that women are deadly.”39 
3. Pathways to Recruitment in Extremist Organizations 
Women’s roles in terrorism are increasingly diverse and complicated. Their 
experiences range from attempting to prevent violence and extremist organizations from 
growing and thriving to actively participating and facilitating this violence. Carol Cohn 
explains:  
Women are raped, tortured, maimed, and murdered, they are widowed, the 
children they have nurtured are lost to violence; but women are also 
members and supporters of the of the militaries and armed groups that 
commit these acts. Women stay home, resolutely striving to sustain family 
                                                 
36 Cragin and Daly, 87–88. 
37 International Crisis Group, Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency, 10. 
38 Von Knop, “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” 401. 
39 Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism, 34. 
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and community relationships; and women are displaced, living in camps 
without any of the structures that they have built to make life possible. 
Women are empowered by taking on new roles in wartime, and 
disempowered by being abducted from their homes and forced into armed 
groups or military prostitution.40  
Women, both coerced and willing volunteers, have become increasingly involved 
in every aspect of terrorism, arguably more so than their male counterparts in that in 
many cultures, women both single and married will fill the supporting roles of mothers, 
teachers, and wives.41 Their motivations can be encapsulated into five main categories: 
revenge, relationship, respect, redemption, and rape.42 These motivations can be broken 
up into two main pathways to recruitment: voluntary and involuntary.  
a. Voluntary 
The voluntary motivations and subsequent enlistment of women, though not 
significantly different than their male counterparts, trend toward women with violent 
ideology being a product of their environment. This phenomenon can best be understood 
as “a radicalization process, rather than a one-time choice to join or not join a terrorist 
organization.”43 Radicalization into extremist organizations is the largest motivating 
factor as well as enlistment avenues for women who voluntarily join. As Cragin and Daly 
describe, the radicalization process has three components: availability, recruitment and 
indoctrination, and action.44 Availability depends on an individual’s circumstances prior 
to being exposed to the extremist organization, whether that is discrimination, oppression, 
pressures from family or friends, or conflict.45 Recruitment and indoctrination takes 
place as soon as first contact is made between the organization and potential recruit. This 
first contact can be done through family members, friends, recruiters within the 
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community.46 Individuals also can seek out and volunteer for terrorist organizations or 
they may have been tapped to perform a specific role or mission.47 The last stage of 
radicalization is action. Cragin and Daly explain that women typically have the same 
indoctrination experiences and tests as men during this state of radicalization. This 
indoctrination process could be in the form of training camps or in smaller armed 
conflicts throughout the region. Participating in minor armed conflicts consequently 
allows women to prove that they have the same loyalty and commitment to their 
organization and cause as their male counterparts.48  
Revenge has been cited as one of the largest influencers and motivators for female 
enlistment in extremist organizations, whether it is to avenge the death of a close family 
member or retaliate for past wrongs committed against the woman herself.49 
Relationship, as Bloom explains, is the best indicator of if and how involved a woman is 
likely to be engaged in violence.50 While this method is not direct coercion, the pressure 
felt by women who either marry into the organization or have family members within the 
insurgency is generally enough to incorporate them into the system. In many cases, if a 
woman becomes a widow within the extremist organization, she will be immediately 
remarried to another member. This promise of security is enough for many women to 
seek relationships within extremist organizations. Respect also plays a large role in the 
decision of many women to join. Female suicide bombers are considered role models in 
their communities, as it shows that they have just as much commitment to the cause as 
their male counterparts, essentially making them posthumous celebrities.51  
Redemption, the last voluntary trend, occurs when women are trying to make up 
for past sins or any scandalous acts that they have committed prior to first contact with 
the extremist organization. As Bloom indicates, “there have been reports that recruiters 
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approach their targets by making romantic advances, literally seducing them into joining 
the group and then involving them in suicide operations.”52 Extremist organizations offer 
the hope of erasing all culturally embarrassing and scandalous transgressions of women’s 
pasts through martyrdom. They offer them the chance to change their family reputation 
from shameful to heroic.53 
b. Involuntary 
Perhaps the most disturbing motivation and recruitment strategy though is rape, 
and the mental manipulation that rape has on women.54 While not every woman in the 
world who is raped joins a terrorist organization, the women within conflict zones who 
are subjected to gender violence are particularly vulnerable to joining extremist 
organizations. They can be seeking revenge, redemption, and the promise of relationship 
by organization members if they have been ostracized from their home communities. Of 
note, this method of recruitment is not directly involuntary; these women still have the 
free will and ability to choose not to join. Still there is a close connection. For example, 
rape survivors in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been reported as 
joining in search of redemption as they had been socially prohibited from marriage or 
childbearing because of their rapes. In other words, becoming martyrs and suicide 
bombers was the only acceptable way to contribute to society and not be a disgrace to 
their society.55  
Within Boko Haram, there has been an emerging trend of kidnapping women and 
forcing them into enlistment. Boko Haram’s ideology exempts Muslim women from 
combat roles within the organization, though it is documented that this exemption is 
being relaxed and women are beginning to step into the line of fire more often.56 In 
contrast though, Boko Haram’s ideology says nothing about the Christian women that 
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members abduct, who, at least in the early years of the organization, have been suspected 
of being used for all of Boko Haram’s female suicide bombings.57 It is of note that that 
organization has grown and evolved throughout the years and more women organic to the 
organization, meaning those who were not recruited through kidnapping, have begun to 
volunteer for suicide missions. Abductions of women have become a semi-official tactic 
within the Boko Haram organization since 2012 and have contributed considerably to the 
enlistment of non-voluntary participants and the roles that they are forced to play.58 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on the examined literature, several hypotheses have emerged in order to 
explain the use of women within Boko Haram that are unique to this organization. In 
addition, recruitment tactics and enlistment motivations for women are being used more 
prevalently than documented in the past century. Three hypotheses will shed light on why 
and how Boko Haram is setting itself apart from its historic, cross-regional counterparts 
and how it is following in their historic trends:  
Hypothesis 1: Based on existing knowledge of how women are used in extremist 
organizations, it is highly likely that Boko Haram is deviating from the trends and is 
using women as pawns and bargaining chips in order to gain leverage over their 
opposition and to create shock value in the media.  
The first hypothesis assumes that women are being kidnapped and forced to 
participate as pawns in a larger, men’s organization. Since resurgence in 2009, Boko 
Haram has carried out a series of kidnappings that would soon marked a new tactic and 
norm for this organization. Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau issued a statement 
following a particularly bloody and prolonged attack promising “to make these hostages 
his ‘servants’ if certain conditions, such as the release of Boko Haram members and their 
wives from prison, were not met.”59 Since then, kidnappings have become a common 
tactic for Boko Haram both for political and pragmatic reasons. This hypothesis does not 
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encompass the entire spectrum of motivations that have been recorded for women within 
Boko Haram and does not take into consideration the voluntary enlistment of these 
participants.  
Hypothesis 2: Regarding enlistment into the organization, current scholarship 
notes that most women enlist voluntarily for combat intensive roles. It his highly likely 
that Boko Haram is using the women whom they have kidnapped and tortured (either 
physically or mentally) as their main method of gaining female soldiers for combat such 
roles as suicide bombers, which would be deviating from historical norms. 
In the case of suicide bombing, for example, it is a theorized that women are less 
likely to be suspected as suicide bombers and therefore have a higher chance of carrying 
out their mission.60 Women who appear pregnant are seldom be stopped by security or 
law enforcement, and women seeking shelter at internally displaced person (IDP) camps 
are often not searched due to lack of suspicion or out of modesty.61 In order to maximize 
utility of women and capitalize on their unique skills and circumstances, women are 
strategically being recruited in order to support specific roles and missions. Throughout 
cross-regional organizations, the enlistment of women as suicide bombers is a common 
and successful, theme; however, the tactic of kidnapping and forcing women to become 
suicide bombers is unique to Boko Haram. Therefore, it unquestionably must be 
considered when assessing and creating a plan of action for combatting that organization. 
Hypothesis 3: Regarding individual motivations for women to enlist in Boko 
Haram, existing literature agrees that many women are seeking increased equality and 
legitimacy within society; they view participation in political activism and increased 
involvement in Islamic extremist organizations as a means by which to achieve these 
ends.  
The final hypothesis argues that women are using their organization’s cause as a 
stepping stone toward increased equality and respect within their society. As discussed, 
female suicide bombers are considered role models within their societies, as they can 
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create legitimacy and an increased cultural respect for women through their activism 
within extremist organizations.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis compares the female component of three historical terrorist 
organizations—The Chechen Black Widows, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the Afghanistan 
Taliban, all which are Islamic extremist organizations, and two of which have heavily 
utilized women in their fighting forces through different means. The Afghanistan 
Taliban, however, did not utilize women in martyrdom until pressured to do so by its 
Pakistani counterparts. This seemingly contradictory example was chosen in order to 
establish a counter narrative within the realm of Islamic extremist organizations and show 
the spectrum of utilization of women within FTOs.  
The thesis first establishes a background of female involvement and motivations 
within these three terrorist organizations in order to establish cross-regional similarities 
and differences, and then analyze these cross-regionally established themes and compare 
them to what the international community is seeing in the present day with Boko Haram. 
This comparison enables the reader to look at these case studies that have already been 
resolved and studied and have a better understanding of how to best combat and 
understand this current threat. In order to establish themes between similarities and 
differences, I analyze female involvement as well as motivations of female insurgents 
within Boko Haram by providing an analysis taken from a mixture of both academically 
published works as well as data taken from international news articles on the most recent 
activity. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is broken up into four chapters. The introduction provides a historical 
background and thus, structural foundation, of both female involvement in terrorism 
globally as well as the Boko Haram FTO. The introduction is followed by a chapter in 
which I establish trends and themes of female integration and motivations of both 
individuals and those recruiting them from three major terrorist organizations, which 
were chosen based on geographical location and Islamic extremist ties. These show that 
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these trends and themes can be found globally and establish that even within extremist 
organizations of the same religion, a spectrum of utilization of women is present. This 
chapter includes a brief background for each terrorist organization, as it is not the focus 
of this thesis, but is essential to understanding the context of the terrorist organization. 
The third chapter of this thesis delves into the activities of female insurgents within Boko 
Haram, as well as its enlistment motivations. The conclusion analyzes Boko Haram 
against its other Islamic FTO counterparts. It analyzes findings and key points as well as 
provide recommendations on how to proceed with the pursuit of stability and peace 




II. CROSS-REGIONAL SHADOW CASES 
Prior to analyzing how Boko Haram utilizes women, it is valuable to analyze how 
FTOs at large utilize women within their organizations. The following sections provide a 
background into the Chechen Black Widows, the women of the Afghani Taliban, and the 
women of Al-Qaeda. These three organizations yield examples of commonalities and 
disparities that transcend cultural boundaries and will provide a background as a basis of 
comparison for Boko Haram’s utilization of women.  
A. THE CHECHEN REBELS—THE BLACK WIDOWS 
On June 7, 2000, Khava Barayeva and Luisa Magomadova drove a truck filled 
with explosives into the temporary headquarters of a Russian Special Forces detachment, 
injuring five and killing two people, and in turn opened the world’s eyes to what would 
be one of the deadliest separatists groups to date.62 Until this date, the Chechen rebels 
had not utilized suicide bombers in their fight against Russia, and women specifically had 
only engaged in supporting roles throughout the organization. The women in Chechnya 
who served in support of the Chechen Rebels during the second Chechen war provide a 
unique model for the integration of women into an extremist organization, as they share 
the Islamic religious affiliation and ideology of Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, and the LTTE, 
but differ significantly in culture from their cross-regional counterparts. The Chechen 
Black Widows, as named by the Russian and international press, attained their name in 
the early 2000s and have since participated in over 70 percent of Chechnya’s suicide 
bombing attacks, with a staggering 50 percent of those attacks being carried out solely by 
women.63 With the most known resistance fighters of this war being the Chechen Black 
Widows, this section will focus on their contribution to their cause.  
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Support for suicide bombings is a new phenomenon in Chechen culture.64 Kurz 
and Bartles explain, “the majority of the Chechen population does not believe that suicide 
bombers further the well-being of the community. Most Chechens deplore the practice 
and favor peace over the violent pursuit of national independence. Videos of suicide 
missions in Chechnya, for example, are not distributed to the Chechen population.”65 
Yet, Chechen women were the first females to engage in religious terrorism in a 
combatant role.66 While they paved the way for other Muslim women to participate in 
jihad, they first and foremost shocked the international community with just how far 
these women were willing to go to support their cause. 
1. Background 
In order to understand the first, and ongoing second Russo-Chechen conflict it is 
best to understand the history between the Russian and the Caucasus Region, specifically 
Chechnya. Though the Chechen people have been identified as distinct from their 
Russian neighbors since the 17th century, they were subjected to Russian rule and 
Bolshevik occupation since the Russian Revolution in 1917. During World War II, 
Chechen and Ingush units collaborated with Nazi Germans, and consequently in 1944 
Joseph Stalin deported between an estimated 400,000 to 800,000 Chechen nationals to 
Central Asia. Though repatriated in 1956 following the death of Stalin, Chechen citizens 
have not forgotten their forced exodus from their homeland. Upon the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, many states within the Caucasus Region pushed for independence 
from their regional-hegemon, Russia. Chechnya was no exception, and for possible 
geopolitical or economic reasons, was not granted independence from Russia and was 
instead met with an occupation of Russian troops. This led to the first Russo-Chechen 
conflict, which lasted from 1994 to 1996 and ended with Russian and Chechen officials 
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signing a peace agreement in Dagestan.67 With this historical tension ripe with conflict, 
unwanted occupation and unrecognized sovereignty, the stage was prime for another 
conflict and consequently the second Russian-Chechen conflict broke out in 1999.  
In the three years following the first Chechen war, militant groups gained strength 
and notoriety among both the Chechen people, and the Russian authority. The terrain in 
Chechnya is vastly diverse, with plains in the north, woodlands in central Chechnya near 
the capital of Grozny, and treacherous mountains in the southern half.68 In the wake of 
Aslan Maskhadov’s election as president in 1997 though, this southern region became 
home to guerrilla fighters, who could easily store ammunition and weaponry, carry out 
elaborate ambushes of Russian forces, as well as move almost seamlessly between 
surrounding Georgia, Dagestan, and Ingushetia where safe havens had been established 
for insurgent forces.69 Russian President Vladimir Putin refers to the second Chechen 
conflict as an “anti-terrorist operation,”70 considering that all public order and discipline 
had broken down after the first conflict and was never reestablished by elected president, 
Aslan Maskhadov.71 Under the pressure of Islamic extremists, he established strict sharia 
law throughout Chechnya in February 1999.72 This pressure from both extremist 
organizations and the Russian government produced a volatile political environment and 
an environment that could not be sustained for very long without conflict. 
Shamil’ Basaev, a young warlord and losing presidential opponent to Maskhadov 
had gained the support of groups of “professional Islamists” who had been “trained in the 
Peshawar camps and commanded by Ibn al-Khattab, a jihadist who had fought earlier in 
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Tadjikistan and Afghanistan.”73 These groups carried out attacks in defiance of the 
Russian government’s hold on Chechnya as well as the rule of President Maskhadov, but 
never gained much traction in the media. The relative obscurity of these attacks is 
partially attributable to the rural and remote locations where they took place in relation to 
the rest of the world, as well as with the overshadowing of Russia’s power. As a result, 
the international media was slow to pick up on the struggles of the Islamic extremists 
within Chechnya.74 Chechen rebels resorted to more extreme methods of violence, not 
only to disrupt the domestic government and repel the perceived Russian occupation, but 
to gain international media attention as well.  
2. Tactics 
Since mid-2000, Chechen rebels have focused on four types of attacks against the 
Russians as well as the Chechen government, which they saw as appeasing the perceived 
Russian occupation. These attacks began strictly with targeting the Russian military. 
Mark Kramer outlines these attacks as targeting: (1) Convoys, groups, and facilities of 
Russian troops and administrative personnel; (2) Russian military helicopters and aircraft; 
(3) individual Russian soldiers; and (4) officials and buildings associated with the pro-
Russian Chechen government that was installed by Russian forces in mid-2000.75 When 
these tactics did not produce the desired outcome, Chechen rebels extended attacks 
outside domestic borders and from strictly military to generalized civilian targets.76 
Kramer continues his outline of tactics outside of the Northern Caucasus, where 
“Chechen rebels have focused mainly on (1) crowds of civilians in Moscow and 
elsewhere; (2) key transport systems and government buildings; and (3) other civilian 
‘soft’ targets.”77 Through the execution of these high profile attacks, Chechen rebels are 
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able to guarantee political and media attention. Women at the forefront of these attacks 
increased both shock value and interest.  
Since the beginning of the second Chechen conflict, it has been evident that the 
Chechen rebels were willing to utilize women within their ranks without regard or need 
for fatwas.78 This willingness stands outside the norm of many Islamic extremist 
organizations as most of these organizations such as the Afghan Taliban, for religious or 
cultural reasons, do not include their women in combatant roles unless it is absolutely 
necessary. 
Karla Cunningham reported in 2008 that, “Since 2000, there have been 112 
suicide terrorists, of whom forty-eight were women (43 percent) and sixty-four were men 
(57 percent). Women have been involved with 81 percent of the total suicide attacks 
involving Chechen rebels, and men working alone have carried out only 18 percent of the 
attacks.”79 This adoption of women by the Chechen rebels immediately into the ranks 
traditionally reserved for men is likely the result of how ‘modern and westernized’ they 
were prior to conflict. As Cindy Ness describes, women were made to keep “with former 
Soviet gender policies that emphasized female education and employment.”80 Ness 
further explains that “Chechnya’s turn to Wahhabism, fanned by Arab mercenaries, 
appears to be more the product of political compromise to secure funding than of a 
Chechen commitment to Islamic belief.”81 Therefore, it is most likely that the blend of 
increased nationalism and religious ideology allowed for the utilization of women from 
the beginning of the second Chechen conflict. Knowing that within the history of 
Chechnya’s struggle with a perceived oppression by Russia they were not getting the 
international media attention desired to raise awareness of their occupation, it is no 
surprise that from the start, Chechen rebels attacked with a strategy that would gather the 
most attention. 
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The Chechen Black Widows provide insight into how intense a culture of revenge 
coupled with religious backing and a heightened sense of nationalism can have on a 
conflict. The circumstances leading to the martyrdom of women within Chechnya drove 
them to become one of the most well-known and deadly groups of terrorist women that 
history has seen. According to Speckhard and Akhmedova,  
[prior] to the war, Chechen women had enjoyed more freedoms and 
occupational choices than women within … other [Islamic extremist] 
groups perhaps lending to their immediate unfettered inclusion as bombers 
on par with the men. Likewise, as more men were killed and missing from 
their families, Chechen women were increasingly free to take on the 
culturally assigned role of avenging their deaths.82  
While the Chechen rebels’ more liberalized, secular stance on the incorporation of 
women on the frontlines is more progressive than their Islamic FTO counterparts, their 
ideology is similar to that of Al-Qaeda and other global jihadi groups, just focused on a 
nationalistic level.83 
3. Motivations  
The first and arguably most notable characteristic that can be found similarly 
throughout the Black Widow’s international counterparts were their motivations—
notably revenge. Robert Kurz and Charles Bartles state that, “in nearly all cases, Chechen 
suicide bombers did not broadcast their intentions beforehand or make statements on 
behalf of Islam and their people, suggesting that religious zeal and/or martyrdom is not 
the primary motivation used by most suicide recruiters in Chechnya. In many cases, the 
underlying motivation—particularly for female suicide bombers—is revenge.”84 
Traditionally, Chechens live by a cultural ethos that designates the responsibility of 
avenging the death of a loved one to the family members.85 This concept of direct 
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revenge enacted solely upon the wrongdoer has expanded in a wartime era to revenge on 
those who were not directly responsible for the wrongdoing.86 
Revenge has been cited as one of the largest influencers and motivators for female 
enlistment in extremist organizations, whether it is to avenge the death of a close family 
member or retaliate for past wrongs committed against the woman herself.87 This wave 
of hatred and the need for revenge coupled with external Wahabbi ideologies adopted 
from well-established Afghan and Al Qaeda groups encouraged the Chechen population’s 
acceptance and overall encouragement of suicide terrorism.88 In December 2003, 
Chechen rebel leader Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi stated,  
As you have seen and noticed, most of the suicide attacks were carried out 
by women… these women, particularly the wives of the mujahedin who 
were martyred, are being threatened in their homes, their honor and 
everything are being threatened. They do not accept being humiliated and 
living under occupation.89  
The women among the Chechen rebels had mandated cultural norms that dictated 
a duty to avenge the death of a family member. This instilled duty led to a deep-rooted 
hatred and drive for revenge consequently making them the perfect candidates for 
martyrdom.90 
In conjunction with or related to Chechen women’s perceived need for revenge 
are the personal traumas that they have endured, whether that be the death or torture of a 
loved one, or sexual violence enacted upon them. Anne Speckhard writes that, in regards 
to studies conducted on the Black Widow’s motivations:  
as far as we could discern, none of the Chechen suicide bombers in our 
sample had a serious personality disorder prior to deciding to join a terror 
group. No less important however, is that all individuals within the sample 
had experienced deep personal traumatization, and evidence of symptoms 
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of post-traumatic stress disorder and dissociative phenomena as a result of 
direct personal traumatization were present in the entire sample.91  
In addition to a personal need for revenge, the Black Widows show the desire for 
political activism and a strongly instilled sense of nationalism. The Black Widows 
exemplify a motivational linkage between political activism, religion, and personal 
revenge. David Cook explains that, “to date, women fighting in jihad have only been a 
factor in these nationalistic-Islamic resistance movements [Palestinian and Chechen], but 
not in other globalist radical Muslim warfare”92 The Chechen rebels were quick to utilize 
women from the beginning of conflict, which can be theorized as an outcome of their 
“modernized” stance on gender policies, education and employment stances for 
women.93 The combatant role of women in political and nationalistic violence is most 
frequently seen as being associated with leftist movements. Ness explains, “[B]y their 
very nature, left-wing groups are ideologically more suited to justify and advocate 
women assuming combatant and other non-traditional roles because they premise that 
fundamental problems in the political and social institutions of society require a radical 
break with the past.”94 The increased involvement of women in both combatant and non-
combatant roles within the Chechen conflict provides insight on the enthusiastic use of 
women within an Islamic extremist organization, under the guise of nationalistic and 
revenge motivations. 
B. AL QAEDA—THE FEMALE JIHAD 
In the wake of September 11, 2001, the largest threat to the United States has 
been terrorist threats that subscribe to the “Global Jihad movement.”95 The Salafiya-
Jihadia movement evolved during the 20th century and is an offshoot of Salafi 
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ideology.96 Though this movement is global and has branches and influence on almost 
every continent, Al-Qaeda stands firmly in its fundamentalist beliefs and shows that 
while cultural influences can impact associated “branch” affiliates, the core of Al-Qaeda 
only began to utilize women in accordance with its beliefs when absolutely necessary and 
with no other option.  
1. Background 
Unlike the Chechen rebels, Al-Qaeda is more of an ideology and international 
jihad with many affiliated organizations and networks than a centralized extremist 
organization within one, or a few countries. Also, unlike many Islamic extremist 
organizations throughout the world, Al-Qaeda poses a direct threat to the United States, 
and therefore has warranted significant domestic as well as international political and 
media attention since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Conceptualized by 
Palestinian religious cleric Abdullah Azzam in 1987 and founded by Osama bin Laden in 
the late stages of the Soviet-Afghan war in 1988, Al-Qaeda has had a role in countless 
terrorist attacks worldwide. Its goal is to wage a global jihad under three doctrinal tenets: 
“to unite the world’s Muslim population under sharia; to liberate the ‘holy lands’ from 
the ‘Zionist-Crusader’ alliance, and to alleviate perceived economic and social 
injustices.”97 Though its associated organizations have begun incorporating women in 
their ranks, Al-Qaeda proper (i.e., the core segments of the extremist organization) has 
yet to utilize women in combatant roles, and has contained them to supporting functions 
only.98 
Based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda is today led by Ayman al-Zawahiri 
and his top aides.99 The complexity in combating Al-Qaeda, and a major contribution to 
its growth and success, is that it is a hybrid between a hierarchical structured organization 
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and a network structured terrorist organization. This structure is advantageous to the al 
Qaeda organization as it allows for cells to form and operate through the facilitation of 
the internet and without necessarily meeting in person.100 Additionally, it allows for this 
organization to conduct complex tasks requiring extensive coordination and professional 
training and allows the organization to grow extensively and have global influence and 
recruitment. By operating as a network structured organization, Al-Qaeda is able to 
recruit and promote a jihadist ideology across all regions of the world, and, when 
necessary, revert back to the more efficient hierarchical structure. Rohan Gunaratna 
explains that Al-Qaeda is  
characterized by a broad-based ideology, a novel structure, a robust 
capacity for regeneration and a very diverse membership that cuts across 
ethnic, class and national boundaries. It is neither a single group nor a 
coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, 
satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political 
parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for 
offensive actions and other responsibilities.101  
Burke describes how, at ideological conception, Azzam “envisaged men who, 
acting independently would set an example for the rest of the Islamic world and thus 
galvanize the umma (global community of believers) against its oppressors.”102 This 
organizational structure based globally and on a jihad ideology has allowed for Al-Qaeda 
to grow into one of the most dangerous and deadly extremist organizations in the world.  
2. Tactics 
The approach that Al-Qaeda has taken regarding the incorporation of women is 
multifaceted and women’s integration is on the rise. Although organizations associated 
with Al-Qaeda have integrated women into their combatant ranks out of necessity, Al-
Qaeda proper has been very reserved.103 Ness explains that, “while al-Qaeda proper has 
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been rumored to be training squads of women to engage in violent jihad since 9/11, to 
date it is not known to have dispatched any females on a suicide mission.”104 Women 
participating in this global jihad primarily fill the roles of facilitators, supporters, 
educators and recruiters.105 
Al-Qaeda was extremely reluctant to integrate women into any combative roles 
until absolutely necessary. Anne Speckhard explains that, “Al Qaeda in Iraq was similar 
to the Palestinians, only equipping women for suicide missions when they became 
desperate in the face of enhanced security. Knowing that women in burqas could still 
breach checkpoints to carry out attacks, the group began to send them in droves.”106 This 
aversion to their direct usage in combat does not, though, depict the utilization of women 
within the organization as a whole. Women are increasingly being recruited by Al-Qaeda 
through the internet, as it places them on equal footing with their male counterparts, in 
spite of the conservative nature of the societies in which they live. 
Six fatawa have been issued allowing women to participate in martyrdom 
operations. These fatawa have been issued by Yussuf al Qaradawi, three by the faculty at 
al-Azhar University Egypt, Faysal al-Mawlawi of the European Council for Research and 
Legal Opinion based in Dublin, and Nizar Abd al-Qadir Riyyam of the Islamic University 
of Gaza and explicitly dictate the role of women within this global jihad. Osama bin 
Laden states in the fatawa, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the 
Land of the Two Holy Places” that: 
Our women had set a tremendous example for generosity in the cause of 
Allah; they motivate and encourage their sons, brothers and husbands to 
fight for the cause of Allah in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Chechnya and in other countries. (…) May Allah strengthen the belief—
Imaan—of our women in the way of generosity and sacrifice for the 
supremacy of the word of Allah. (…) Our women instigate their brothers 
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to fight in the cause of Allah. (…) Our women encourage Jihad saying: 
Prepare yourself like struggler; the matter is bigger than the words.107 
Within these fatawa, women are encouraged to take an active role in the jihad 
through enabling the men in their lives, and thus placing them in supporting roles.  
Al-Qaeda (proper and associated) have utilized women heavily in supporting roles 
since its inception. This integration has played a vitally important role in both the short 
and long-term survival of the organization.108 Women are the educators of the Al-Qaeda 
youth; they are tasked with raising them and teaching them the jihadi ideology. Von 
Knop explains that, “having 8, 10, or 12 children and educating them to become a Shahid 
is the Jihad of a mother.”109 The women of Al-Qaeda are utilizing their influence within 
their communities, and most importantly, in their families to recruit and raise the current 
and future generations of jihadi soldiers, whether this be through networking via the 
internet or in social and familial settings. Women have also proven to be highly effective 
recruiters to the jihad. Malika al Aroud, for example, was a Belgian woman who used a 
website that attempted to shame men into joining the global jihad.110 She explained in 
her 2008 New York Times interview, “it’s not my role to set off bombs—that’s ridiculous 
… I have a weapon. It’s to write. It’s to speak out. That’s my jihad. You can do many 
things with words. Writing is also a bomb.”111 The utilization of women in promoting 
Al-Qaeda’s jihadi ideology and global recruiting campaign is a softer, more inviting 
approach that allows for the organization to reach out and bring in a wider, more diverse 
group of Muslims into the fold. 
3. Motivations 
The women who are influenced by and being utilized in the Al-Qaeda 
organization are doing so in the name of religious jihad. Due to the Al-Qaeda’s global 
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nature, it is likely that though underlying motivations may have nationalistic tones, the 
core motivations lay within religion. Women are heavily involved in recruitment of 
future Al-Qaeda soldiers. European intelligence officials have noted that there is an 
increase in the utilization of women within Al-Qaeda. While there is a rise in female 
suicide bombers, women’s roles are still predominantly support-based. Intelligence 
officials still recognize that women hold just as deadly a role as “organizers, 
proselytizers, teachers, translators and fundraisers who either join their husbands in the 
fight or step into the breach as men are jailed or killed.”112 Social media and the internet 
are strong tools for global recruitment of Al-Qaeda members, and in particular, women. 
Impressionable young women around the world are lured in via flashy online magazines, 
articles, and conversations with members who glorify female roles in the jihad. This 
promise of a global jihad against the Western world and the rhetoric that—according to 
Abdallah Azzam—”jihad is every man’s duty (fard ayn) wherever Muslim lands are 
occupied by foreigners”113 By capitalizing on religious duty, women are lured into 
supporting roles within Al-Qaeda around the world.  
C. THE AFGHAN TALIBAN—THE FEMALE COMPONENT 
In stark contrast to the Chechen Rebels and Al-Qaeda, the Afghanistan Taliban 
uses women in combatant roles in a very limited capacity, and with very limited 
publication and vocalization on its use of women. Members of the Taliban are experts of 
their own terrain and populations within it. They have proven to be sophisticated in their 
ability to adapt and innovate on the battlefield in order to most effectively combat their 
adversaries. Yet though they have mastered the ability to adapt and overcome the 
occupation challenges that they have faced within their Afghanistan homeland, they have 
been extremely reluctant to utilize women within combat and martyrdom roles, thus 
emphasizing the spectrum of roles and engagement of women within Islamic extremist 
organizations globally. By capitalizing on the cultural sensitivity though that comes with 
being a woman or child within Afghanistan, the incorporation of Pakistani Taliban 
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suicide bombing methods has led to the deployment of women and children into this 
method of martyrdom. This allows for insurgents to more easily bypass security measures 
and enter the busiest areas without question or scrutiny, thus creating the largest casualty 
count possible. 
1. Background 
Coming to prominence in late 1994, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), 
more commonly are known as the Afghanistan Taliban, bears considerable similarities to 
its Islamic FTO counterparts. Similar to the Chechen Rebels, the Taliban came into 
existence with a message and campaign to expel Western influence from its country. 
Originating as an Afghanistan sect of the Pakistan Taliban who emerged in the early 
1990s, the Afghani sect promoted a message of being the protectors of Islam and the only 
legitimate authority within Afghanistan.114 The emergence of the Taliban can be 
attributed to three factors:  
first, the lack of state-building and inability of the Afghan government…; 
second, the failure to secure and stabilize the rural areas of the country so 
that development and reconstruction can proceed, and; third, the lack of 
any significant material improvement in the lives of most Pashtuns in the 
south and east of the country since the demise of the Taliban regime.115  
Established out of perceived necessity to rid its nation of unwanted Western 
presence, the Afghanistan Taliban has successfully manipulated Islamic rhetoric in 
attempt to destabilize its U.S.-supported Kabul government and implement Shar’iah 
law.116  
In the aftermath of the fall of Kabul in April of 1992 to the local mujahedeen, 
Afghanistan had fallen into a bloody anarchy.117 In September of 1996, the Afghanistan 
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Taliban retook power within Kabul, supported by both the United States and Pakistan and 
at the time funded by the Pakistani secret service (ISI). Though the Islamic religious 
ideology manifested in its most literal and ossified form, the Taliban provided stability 
and order in a country that had been subject to “four years of devastation, murder, rape, 
and pillage at the hands of the mujahedeen faction commanders.”118 This regime’s early 
success and popularity was founded in its ability to bring law and order back to the 
people of Afghanistan, when corruption, lawlessness and unsolicited violence reigned.119 
Once in power, the Afghani Taliban held its promise to instill peace and security 
through the implementation of Shar’iah law. At the core of its beliefs were six themes by 
which it ruled. Thomas Johnson explains:  
• That Taliban victory in cosmic conflict is inevitable;  
• That Islam cannot be defeated; 
• That the Taliban are “national heroes” and willing to sacrifice all for Allah 
and country;  
• That Afghans have a long and honorable history of defeating invading 
foreign infidels; 
• That foreign invaders as well as their Afghan puppets are attempting to 
destroy Afghan religion and traditions; 
• That all Afghans have an obligation to join the jihad against the foreigners 
and apostates.120 
Though the Taliban remained firmly in power throughout Afghanistan, they 
extensively benefitted from United States and Saudi Arabian financial and management 
support, as they did not have either the competence or resources to do so without help.121 
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Without this support, the Afghanistan Taliban could rule and maintain power solely off 
the proceeds of contraband and opium.122 
When the attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Centers in New 
York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, occurred, the Taliban and its regime 
came into the international spotlight. Not because they were credited with the attacks, but 
because it came to light that they had been providing safe haven as well as establishing 
effective partnership with both Osama Bin Laden and other key leadership of the Al-
Qaeda organization in Afghanistan.123 This international spotlight on the extremist rule 
of the Afghani Taliban and its implementation of Shar’iah law as well as its blatant 
deprivation of human rights to the women of Afghanistan led to the invasion of 
Afghanistan by American troops with a two-pronged approach. First, to overthrow the 
Taliban regime that United States government had previously supported, and secondly to 
find, capture, and kill Osama Bin Laden and other high-ranking Al-Qaeda officials 
responsible for the attack on American soil.  
2. Tactics 
Since the two occupations of Afghanistan—one by the Soviets from 1980 to 1989 
and the other from US-NATO alliance between 2001 and 2011—the Taliban has been 
quick to modify tactics to most aptly suit its strengths and weaknesses.124 The Taliban 
has found great success in utilizing both suicide bombers and IEDs, using tactics that its 
members learned and adapted from the Iraqi resistance. It also installed shadow 
government structures into Afghan provinces during the expansion of its organization in 
the early 2000s, and utilized the proven successful Shabnamah, or night letters, in order 
to spread its message and influence those that it is trying to control. These tactics allow 
members of the Taliban to know, understand, and connect with the local populations 
much more than the recognized government.  
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With the majority of research conducted being centered on the perceived 
oppression that women have faced at the hands of the Taliban insurgency, little 
quantitative data has been published providing hard numbers of support that women have 
provided to the Afghanistan Taliban. Dr. Rostami Povey, a researcher with the University 
of London, has conducted several field studies on women in Iran and the United 
Kingdom.125 Her qualitative research shows that there was and still is a small minority of 
women who play supporting roles within the Taliban, whether that be within the 
expansive spy network, smuggling of weapons and messages, or by recruiting.126 The 
research of journalist Terese Cristiansson reinforces this theory of supporting roles. She 
states that, “as Taliban wives they play a supporting but important role in the insurgency. 
Not only do they believe in the cause, but they also assist their husbands by smuggling 
weapons under their clothes, carrying messages and taking care of wounded fighters.”127 
These women, though not in a combative role, have just as large of an impact on the 
organization as their combative counterparts. 
Though women have not yet played a large combative role in the Taliban, it is 
clear that this organization has taken advantage of the cultural norms and utilized their 
female members in supporting roles to the fullest extent. These cultural guidelines have 
been outlined in part by Mary Anne Franks:  
• Women may not work outside the home, except for a few health workers, 
or attend any kind of educational institution. 
• Women are not allowed to leave their house at all unless accompanied by 
a mahram (a close male relative). 
• Women are not allowed to be treated by male doctors. 
                                                 
125 Seran de Leede, “Afghan Women and the Taliban: An Exploratory Assessment,” in ICCT Policy 
Brief (Hague, Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 2014), 5, www.icct.nl. 
126 de Leede, 5–7. 
127 de Leede, 6. 
 34 
• Women must wear a burqa (a garment that covers the body completely, 
with only a piece of mesh around the eyes) at all times. 
• Women may not gather for any public functions or festivities. 
• Women are not allowed to use cosmetics. 
• The windows of women’s houses must be painted over, so that women 
cannot be seen from the outside. 
• Women must not talk or laugh loudly, must not wear high-heeled shoes or 
any shoes that make noise, must not wear bright colors, or at any moment 
allow any part of their flesh to show, wash clothes in public, or appear on 
the balcony of their houses, so as not to incite the lust of men. 
• The names of places which include a reference to women must be 
changed; for example, “women’s garden” is renamed “spring garden.128 
Though these restrictions are commonly perceived as repressive by the 
international community, they are put into place under the guise of protection for the 
women, and conveniently provide a cultural cover to utilize women in the more active 
supporting roles of moving weapons and messages, and drugs.  
Women in supporting roles play a less visible but invaluable role in the success of 
extremist organizations, in particular Afghanistan’s Taliban. Cragin and Daly note that 
“logistics relate to the ‘procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military material, 
facilities, and personnel; the handling of the details of an operation.’ For terrorist or 
insurgent groups, logisticians smuggle weapons and funds to terrorist leaders and their 
operational cells.”129 Women recruiters are “individuals used or designated by terrorist 
leaders to attract new logisticians, financiers, suicide bombers, or guerrilla fighters into 
their organization. Recruiters also often serve as essential links between a terrorist or 
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insurgent group and popular support communities.”130 In integrating women into these 
supporting roles, the women are able to utilize the aforementioned cultural guidelines to 
their advantage in order to remain under the radar.  
The assertion that the Taliban has and continues to actively recruit women is 
dubious. While it may be actively recruiting and forcing men into martyrdom, little to no 
evidence exists that the Taliban is approaching women for involvement in the same 
way.131 Thomas Johnson explains how the Taliban has adopted shabnamah—or letters 
that are stuck onto walls of the masque or door of literate villagers at night for 
proclamation to the village the following day—into its repertoire for intimidation and 
undoubtedly indirect coercion of women into support.132 He argues that,  
The Taliban night letters represent a strategic and effective instrument, crafting poetic 
diatribes which appeal to the moral reasoning of Afghan villagers. While many of the 
night letters represent overt intimidation, they also present important insights into who 
and what the Taliban represents. The quality and use of these letters have impressed 
professional U.S. information and psychological (PSYOP) officers, who consider them 
‘eloquent and impressive’ and subsequently more effective than the vast majority of U.S. 
information operation artefacts.133 
The Taliban’s night letters provide a connection with local populations that 
occupying forces will never be able to obtain. Night letters are generally plastered to the 
doors and walls of mosques and government buildings due to the fact that the majority of 
the population is illiterate.134 Therefore, the Taliban relies on those that are educated to 
transmit the night letters.135 The significance that these night letters render to the women 
of Afghanistan is the influence that they have through word of mouth. With the Afghan 
people being a tribal culture who put high emphasis on oral history and their families, the 
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Taliban is easily able to capitalize on the literacy rates of the population and influence the 
narrative that is being told through night letters. Combining this tactic with a horizontal 
approach of influence—such as family members or friends—allows the Taliban to reach 
out and inadvertently influence women into supporting not only its cause, but to also 
become active participants in supporting roles.  
Afghanistan’s Taliban’s utilization of women is not one that has entered into the 
combatant and martyrdom realm. Though little quantitative data is available to provide 
numbers, the qualitative research and studies have shown that women are not on the 
sidelines in the Taliban’s fight against Afghanistan occupancy and that their roles within 
the organization should not be brushed aside. Women are still active participants in the 
supporting roles that they play, such as recruiters, spies and smugglers of firearms and 
messages. Though participation is known to be strictly voluntary, the influences of family 
and friends, as well as the subjection to a counter-Western narrative told through oral 
teachings and night letters inevitably plays a large role in painting Taliban objectives as 
enticing and religiously correct.  
These three FTOs show the wide range of female utilization that is seen within 
Islamic extremist organizations globally. It is through these examples a foundation is laid 
for comparison and analysis to Boko Haram. This comparison will allow for accurate 
strategies and tactics to be recommended to the Nigerian and United States government 
on how to best combat the Boko Haram organization. 
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III. THE WOMEN OF BOKO HARAM 
With an understanding provided by the Chechen Rebels, the Afghan Taliban, and 
Al-Qaeda of how women have been utilized within FTOs globally, an informed 
comparison can be made with Boko Haram. This chapter will provide a brief background 
of Boko Haram, how they utilize women, and the avenues by which women are 
integrated into the organization. This will provide the basis of understanding that is 
needed in order for the international community to better understand the unique 
differences that are seen in this FTO and ultimately combat this organization effectively.  
A. CONTEXTUALIZED BACKGROUND 
Boko Haram has significantly evolved in mission, motivation, and tactics since its 
inception in 2002. The conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government 
within northeast Nigeria is complex, as it is deeply rooted in historical, political, 
economic, and ethnic dissension. McQuaid and Asfura-Heim argue that, “Boko Haram is 
a local, ethnic-based (Kanuri) revolutionary insurgent group which utilizes subversion, 
classic guerilla tactics, and terrorism to achieve its goals.”136 Boko Haram and its 
conflict within Northern Nigeria can be best analyzed by dividing it into two major 
timeframes, from 2002 to 2009 and from 2010 to present day. Boko Haram has evolved 
from a peaceful organization aimed at gaining more religious representation within the 
Nigerian government to a dangerous terrorist cell looking for retaliation and to overthrow 
and install an Islamic state within Nigeria.  
1. Boko Haram from 2002 to 2009 
At inception in 2002, Mohammed Yusuf’s vision for Boko Haram was a peaceful, 
da’wa organization that aimed to bring awareness of the institutional inequality of the 
Nigerian government, as well as to preach religious secularism. The idea of da’wa, or 
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“calling people to Islam” became a core duty for the organization.137 Alexander Thurston 
explains that “by emphasizing da’wa, Boko haram sought to convince itself, other 
Salafis, and other Muslims that it had not abandoned global Salafism’s missionary 
goal.”138 They aimed to change a government that has been perceived to have promoted 
economic inequality and religious misrepresentation between the northern and southern 
states. Though the group was formed in 2002, Boko Haram did not become its official 
name until 2010. The Kanuri people—who resided in the Borno province and converted 
to Islam centuries prior to their northern counterparts, the Hausas-Fulanis—saw 
themselves as the “rightful standard-bearers of Islam in Nigeria.”139 They have resided in 
the northeastern region of Nigeria since the territory was claimed by the Borno-Kanuri 
Empire who ruled this territory between 1380 and 1893.140 As the Kanuri people were 
not only segregated along religious fault lines from the southern Christians in which 
conflict has erupted throughout the country between groups, they are also ethnically 
segregated from the Hausas-Fulani people residing in the northwestern region of the 
country. “The Kanuris…accuse the Hausa-Fulani leadership, and in particular the Sultan 
of Sokoto, of corruption and collusion with the Christian government.”141 It is with this 
narrative, and in response to the deep-rooted economic and religious instability within the 
northeastern, Borno region, that Mohammed Yusuf based the foundations of Boko Haram 
and its mission of gaining both legitimate and religious representation within the Nigerian 
government.  
In the early years of Boko Haram, under Mohammed Yusuf’s rule, public 
approval of the organization was extremely high. In an effort for purification that only 
became more radical as the organization grew, he preached what he considered to be an 
orthodox Islam, making a distinction between this religious interpretation and what he 
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considered to be anti-Islamic practices—democracy, constitutionalism, alliances with 
non-Muslims, and Western-style education.142 After leaving the Indimi mosque of his 
teacher Ja’far Adam, because of ethnic differences between the Hausa patronage, Yusuf 
established his own mosque complex and began gathering a strong following of Kanuri 
people, as well as non-Kanuri immigrants to the city of Maiduguri.143 Yusuf was 
predominantly accepted by both the Hausa and Kanuri communities as he preached in 
both languages, yet with Ja’far Adam being ethnically Hausa and Yusuf being Kanuri, 
many of the Kanuri attendees felt that they were being denied teaching and leadership 
positions within the mosque by the Hausa. This ultimately led to a cry for Yusuf to leave 
the Indimi mosque and preach in his own. Once in control of his own mosque, Yusuf 
began to rapidly gain political and popular control. This was propelled by the fact that he 
created an “imaginary state within a state, administering private justice and delivering 
social services.”144 Asfura-Heim and McQuaid explain, “Yusuf wanted to set up a state-
like organization, operating initially on a small scale, parallel to the federal government. 
He believed that his organization would inevitably grow until it would replace the actual 
state.”145 The fact that he had a conservatively estimated constituency of “over five 
hundred people, and a wider audience of interested and sympathetic persons that might 
have reached ten thousand people” can be evidenced in the hagiographies following his 
death in 2009.146 By appealing predominantly to the poor population as well as aligning 
himself with the political elite in Maiduguri, Yusuf placed himself in a prime position to 
accrue resources that he could then allocate to the severely economically disadvantaged.  
On the one hand, the Nigerian economy is one of the fastest growing in the world; 
thus, it would seem counterintuitive that inequality and poverty remain so rampant. Yet 
population growth has vastly outpaced economic growth.147 The population grew from 
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“89 million in 1991 to over 140 million in 2006, to more than 180 million in 2016.…As 
of 2016, 43 percent of the population was under the age of fifteen years; another 19 
percent was under the age of twenty-five.”148 This rapid population growth coupled with 
weakening agricultural production that the northern states so heavily rely on, the poverty 
rate of the northeast rose from 35.6 percent to 72.4 percent between 1980 and 2006. This 
rise in poverty was second only to the northwestern states, where the poverty level 
reached 79.2 percent.149 In comparison to the southern Nigerian states, with poverty rates 
averaging between 55.9 and 63.1 percent, this economic disparity is considerable.150 
This crippling inequality has led to distrust of the Nigerian government and thus the 
popularity of Mohammed Yusuf during his rise and his establishment of Boko Haram.151  
Institutionalized corruption and the consequent economic disparity between the 
northern and southern Nigerian states laid the foundation for the ethnopolitical and 
religious exclusion within government that would drive Boko Haram from a peaceful 
organization based in Islamic fundamentalism to one of violent conflict following the 
death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Philip Roessler defines political exclusion as 
entailing, “the barring or intentional non-appointment of representatives of a subset of the 
population from the central government.”152 This exclusion is evidenced in post-
independence Nigeria, with its long road to state and political creation. Thurston explains 
that the regional political units, or states that Nigeria created, “were meant to give greater 
political [and ethnic] representation to constituencies that felt stifled by the major ethnic 
groups—the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo. In this way, authorities hoped to weaken smaller 
groups’ calls for autonomy and secession. In practice, however, the new states became 
“arena [s] of exploitation” for local elites.”153 This elite manipulation of state-
appropriated resources has resulted in the longstanding perceived inequality of the Kanuri 
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people, and thus the formation of an organization that believed that it could take care of 
the ethnic population through its religious fundamental ideologies when the government 
was failing to do so.  
2. Boko Haram from 2009 to Present 
In the violent encounter with police forces on 11 June 2009, Boko Haram leader 
Mohammed Yusuf was killed. Subsequently, the organization went underground for a 
year-long hiatus. During this time, and under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau—
one of Yusuf’s previously more radical leaders—Boko Haram took the time to regroup 
and transform from a dawah (proselytization) movement into one that “sought to expel 
the northern political establishment and eventually, to overthrow the national 
government.”154 At this point, Boko Haram’s days of public preaching and service were 
over. This newfound organization embraced targeted assassinations, deployment of 
improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and the kidnapping and hostage taking 
of all ages and genders of people.155 Abubakar Shekau neatly wrapped the expedited 
execution of Mohammed Yusuf into the narrative that Boko Haram was the victim of the 
Nigerian state. By killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the state had only eliminated the face of 
the organization; it had not addressed the driving factors and grievances that Boko Haram 
had been preaching. Consequently, the death of Yusuf further drove the extremist 
organization underground and fanned the embers of hatred and revenge into a full-blown 
flame.  
In the days following the violent uprising and clash with Nigerian police, a Boko 
Haram spokesperson released this statement indicating the new era that this organization 
had entered into. He stated:  
We have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The 
aim is to Islamize Nigeria and ensure the rule of the majority Muslims in 
the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one. … From the 
month of August, we shall carry out series of bombings in Southern and 
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Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port 
Harcourt. … We shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate 
irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those 
who oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does 
not go unpunished.156 
This transition to extremist violence would be evidenced in the series of terrorist 
attacks that would follow after Boko Haram’s return in September 2010. The 
organization soon became known for surprise attacks on three main categories of 
people—members of security forces, Borno State politicians from the ruling All Nigeria 
People’s Party (ANPP), and Muslim religious leaders who had publicly denounced the 
sect—with increasing severity and casualty counts and with the expectation that security 
responses would be slow.157 These attacks produced the desired effect of eliciting fear 
from both the local population, providing coverage by domestic and international media, 
as well as finally gaining the attention of Nigerian government authorities as a credible 
threat that needed to be taken seriously.  
In the years following Boko Haram’s turn toward more extremist guerrilla tactics, 
the group was only too willing to take credit for the bombings of Christian churches and 
targeted attacks on religious leaders in an attempt to reignite the historical tensions 
between the northern Muslim community and the southern Christians.158 The group’s 
rhetoric became increasingly sharpened with its demand of the expulsion of Christians 
from the northern Nigerian states. In the early stages of this paradigm shift toward 
martyrdom, the victims of Boko Haram’s violence excluded Muslim bystanders and were 
very targeted attacks, thus indicating the continued adherence to the original ideological 
foundations on which Mohammed Yusuf had based the organization. As years passed, a 
fundamental shift occurred within the global views of the group and its willingness to 
accept collateral damage during targeted violence, and attacks became indiscriminate. By 
2014, Muslim victims themselves had become primary targets.159 These Muslim victims 
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represented a fundamental shift in ideology, from being a dawah movement to one 
focused on jihad, hatred, and revenge.  
In present day it is difficult to determine a way to move forward in ending the 
conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government. Boko Haram’s demands of a 
split Nigerian state and the establishment of a completely Islamic state, to include the 
Christian dominated areas, seems unrealistic. Yet looking in hindsight at the timeline of 
this organization and the key turning points both in the early days of inception, as well as 
in 2009 and 2010 when the group was reorganizing and reestablishing itself, efforts could 
have been made by the federal government to mitigate the root causes. The weak state, 
deep rooted corruption, the carelessly heavy-handedness of the military response, and the 
failed attempt at power-sharing have only exacerbated the anger and revenge motives that 
drive Boko Haram members and only further the death count of innocent bystanders.  
B. UTILIZATION OF WOMEN 
Boko Haram began integrating women into its combatant ranks during its 
reformation in 2010. Since its inception in 2002, the leaders of Boko Haram have 
preached acceptance of women and recruited them to join the organization. But not until 
its resurgence after the death of Mohammed Yusuf did women became actively utilized 
in martyrdom roles. Under the guise of being a vanguard for the interests of Muslim 
women, Boko Haram has utilized abductions and the psychological manipulation of these 
women in order to further its terror campaign in northern Nigeria. An International Crisis 
Group report explains women’s importance to the organization. The group states:  
Women and girls’ importance for Boko Haram stems from their roles and 
how they are perceived in society—both in the North East and in Nigeria 
as a whole. As wives, they enhance social status and provide sexual or 
domestic services (sometimes forced), thereby becoming valuable 
incentives for potential male recruits. Their adherence, willing or force, to 
the movement’s version of Islam can also contribute to the spreading of its 
ideology among other women, but possibly also young men. Women can 
perform roles very different from traditional stereotypes. As the war 
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evolved, women have become recruiters, spies, domestic labor, fighters 
and forced or willing suicide bombers.160 
By utilizing women in both supporting roles and combative roles, Boko Haram 
has become unequivocally effective in its utilization of women and is considered to be 
one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in history.  
1. Suicide Bombers and Fighters 
Though female fighters are not the norm within Boko Haram, they are present 
throughout the organization. More prominent though is the use of female suicide bombers 
who have become an integral part of the organization and their campaign against the 
Nigerian government, and in the organization’s quest to gain international recognition 
and legitimacy. Speckhard and Akhmedova explain that whenever traumatic experiences 
are widespread within areas that are repressed but still have a strong religious ideology 
present, several factors are commonly observed and provide ripe conditions for suicide 
terrorism. These factors include:  
• Demonization of the enemy  
• Promotion of jihad  
• Cultural permission for extreme measures to be taken in conflict resolution 
• Glorification of martyrdom where sacred values are perceived to be worth 
dying for  
• Promises of an afterlife for martyrs  
• Glorification of suffering and giving one’s life for the community good161  
Due to Boko Haram’s increasing hatred for the Nigerian government and 
economic inequality throughout the country, women have become integral to its efforts to 
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gain international political and media attention with female suicide bombers being at the 
core of these tactics.  
Regarding the use of female fighters, one top commander in the Civilian Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) within the Borno State explains that, “there are not many, but they are 
there. I have even seen one using an RPG [rocket-propelled grenade], … the women 
fighters are even more dangerous than the men fighters’ because they seem even more 
fearless than their male counterparts.”162 It is seemingly common that the women used 
for fighting have been brought within the camp; they would start as sympathizers and 
volunteers and over time would be valued for their strength and dedication and would 
then be integrated into fighting forces. Women who become fighters, as opposed to 
suicide bombers, tend to be older than their male counterparts.163 This age disparity is 
possibly because they seemingly must be integrated into the sect, trusted to carry out the 
mission and not run away, and then trained in the art of guerilla warfare prior to being 
utilized within the combatant ranks; whereas suicide bombers are much easier to train 
and equip for a one- time mission. An International Crisis Group report from 2016 
explains:  
Unlike other West African insurgent groups, such as those in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, Boko Haram has nothing like a women’s brigade. Yet, under 
manpower pressure, particularly from 2014, some women and girls were 
trained and joined in attacks. The wife of a Boko Haram leader in the 
Gwoza Hills reportedly carried a gun and killed a vigilante. Armed female 
militants were sighted in the Sambisa forest, riding their own motorcycles. 
Women were said to be involved in a 2016 ambush on the military. On 10 
July 2014, armed females between fourteen and 21 and fighting ‘like 
professionals’ attacked Kirenowa in Marte LGA, Borno state.164 
Whether out of necessity or willingness, by utilizing women in combatant roles 
and not just as suicide bombers, Boko Haram is progressing into a modernized realm of 
warfare and stepping out of fundamentalist tactics. Though there are still not many 
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women integrated into combatant roles, the few that are undoubtedly paving the way for 
increased numbers as the conflict continues.  
Female suicide bombers have become symbolic of Boko Haram’s brutality since 
its resurgence in 2010, with the first female suicide bomber attack being carried out in 
2011.165 Since women martyrs attract so much publicity and international attention, the 
organization has been one of the only extremist organizations to utilize them in its suicide 
bombing endeavors since what could be considered the beginning of its violent phase and 
what the majority of the world views as the conception of the organization. Newsweek 
reported in 2017 that Boko Haram, since April of 2011, has deployed 434 suicide 
bombers of which 244—or 56 percent—were female.166 Gaffey explains that “the trend 
for women to be deployed is increasing, too: since the start of 2017, nearly two-thirds of 
Boko Haram’s suicide attackers are female.”167  
Abubakar Shekau realized that there was great value in breaking gender norms in 
order to gain recognition with not only the Nigerian government, but also the 
international community. Matfess explains, “The symbolic value of using women as 
weapons, including the ability of this tactic to cultivate an aura of fear in local 
populations by upending gender norms and expectations, should not be 
underestimated.”168 As Andrew Walker notes, the “female suicide bombers contained a 
potent propaganda message: that Boko Haram is prepared to destroy the things the West 
holds most valuable.”169 Through the utilization of women as suicide bombers, Boko 
Haram knows that they can send a direct message to the international community that its 
martyrs could be anyone at any time. This sends a direct message that no person is safe 
from the organization and instills fear in the minds of the public, consequently giving 
them the recognition they strive for.  
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Female suicide bombing attacks grew exponentially in frequency in the latter half 
of 2014, mainly focusing on soft targets such as markets and bus stations within urban 
areas.170 An International Crisis Group report states:  
The youngest female bomb-carriers are often victims themselves, with 
little awareness, duped by relatives and possibly drugged. But the older 
bombers seem to have volunteered. A woman who spent two years as a 
captive in Gwoza LGA said she saw seven such women who were 
recruited as suicide bombers and deployed to Maiduguri around March-
April 2015. They reportedly were moved by commitment to jihad and 
apparently indoctrinated over a long period, including with promise of 
direct admission to al-Jinnah (paradise). Some were [also] widows of 
fighters.171 
The utilization of female suicide bombers in fact has been so effective that male 
members of Boko Haram have reportedly been known to dress up as women in order to 
avoid detection and carry out their missions.172 With heightened states of security in 
urban areas by the Nigerian government, it is exponentially easier for women to access 
more crowded venues and carry out their missions more effectively. 
2. Wives and Breeders 
Though Boko Haram extensively uses women as martyrs, the majority of women 
(both abducted and sympathizers) do not actively take part in combatant roles. The 
majority of women within Boko Haram stay within the camp and execute the day-to-day 
activities of keeping the camp running, including, but not limited to, the cooking, 
cleaning, and sexual requests of the men. These women who live and work within the 
camps fall into two main categories: the wives of soldiers and sympathizers and the 
slaves that refuse to conform. There are distinct differences between the wives of soldiers 
and the Boko Haram sympathizers, and the sexual slaves that are used purely to do 
manual labor around the camps and breed future soldiers for the organization. Though the 
wives of foot soldiers do not have all of the privileges that wives of the sect’s leadership 
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do, they do still maintain a much healthier and happier lifestyle than that of those who 
refuse to conform. 
The difference within the hierarchy of women is relatively major. The wives of 
sect leadership have servants who help them with their day-to-day activities as well as the 
most lavish weddings within the sect.173 As well, women who are married to leaders 
within Boko Haram play a large role in managing and organizing the day-to-day 
functions and social services within the camp. For those women married to foot soldiers, 
the weddings are not as extravagant, nor are the privileges. They are mainly responsible 
(as are all wives) for child rearing and the running of the household, but in addition to 
this, these women are occasionally responsible for playing a supporting role to their 
husbands out in town. Matfess explains the roles of soldiers’ wives:  
In addition to keeping house and rearing children, the wives of foot 
soldiers were also sometimes responsible for carrying their husband’s 
weapons. This has two implications: first, the veil of ignorance adopted by 
many women about the sect’s violent activities is, to some degree, a 
charade; and second, the reports from military and vigilante groups of 
women in conservative veils carrying weapons may not refer to female 
fighters, but rather to helpers of the soldiers.174 
The lives of the women who are slaves or submissives, but not married to any 
male Boko Haram member, revolve around the maintaining Qur’anic education for other 
women, as well as the children, born into the organization and dress restrictions as well 
as bearing children for the insurgents. The ability to move between classifications of wife 
and slave or submissive is available. If enslaved women wish to become wives and have 
proven themselves through education and loyalty to the sect, they may be chosen to 
marry one of the soldiers and move up in class. Another defining positional marker for 
how wives are treated is what number wife they are to their husband and how many 
wives their husband has. Men with more wives tend to rank higher in the leadership 
chain, and their wives tend to be better cared for. Women who are married to men of 
higher stature tend to also rank higher in the organization against the other women. They 
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may not be required to do everyday chores, cook for the camp, or teach and raise the 
children. 
Much like outside of the camps within many parts of Nigerian society, the lives of 
women married into Boko Haram revolve around child rearing and the growth of those 
children into either future wives or soldiers. Matfess explains, “according to the wives of 
insurgents, until their sons are old enough to be trained as soldiers and their daughters old 
enough to be married, it is the mother’s responsibility to ensure that the child attends the 
sect’s Qur’anic education and, when appropriate, public preaching.”175 The wives of 
Boko Haram soldiers are well taken care of medically when it comes to childbirth, as 
doctors are highly respected within the organization.176 
Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno, who assumed office after the May 2011 
elections, has explained that “members of Boko Haram ‘have a certain spiritual 
conviction that any child they father will grow to inherit their ideology.’”177 Because of 
this, whether through rape and forced impregnation or through voluntary conception, the 
men of Boko Haram actively seek to convert and recruit all women from towns that they 
raid into the organization to breed as many future soldiers as possible. Governor Shettima 
has noted that this is “procreation without responsibility” given the economic hardships 
that plague Northern Nigeria.178 
C. AVENUES OF RECRUITMENT  
It is important to note, that though Boko Haram does use abduction as a major 
method for growth in ranks, many women willingly volunteer their services and lives to 
the organization. While it is appealing to paint all women within Boko Haram under the 
brush of helpless victims that would be inaccurate and deprive these women of what few 
freedoms they have in Nigerian society. Women within Nigerian society have, 
throughout history, faced systematic structural violence. This oppression blurs “the lines 
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of consent, coercion, autonomy and oppression…Women’s limited opportunities, a result 
of repressive character of social and political norms, particularly in the north, may be 
seen as a coercive ‘push factor,’ encouraging female participation in the radical 
group.”179 Though the gender politics of the organization have changed, Boko Haram 
has always been, and continues to be, comparatively pro-woman when viewed against 
larger Nigerian social and political systems. Female support and recruitment to this 
organization fall under two categories, voluntary and involuntary. 
1. Voluntary Recruitment 
Under Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram made the effort to “capitalize on the 
marginalization of women in order to garner their support.”180 The organization worked 
to provide Islamic education for women that was not readily available or prioritized. 
Ahmed-Ghosh argues, 
When questioning how women become involved with extreme religious 
groups the world over, it is important to understand that women ‘may see 
religious movements as serving their own interests, interests which focus 
on maintaining the household and the community’. Particularly in sects 
with a group-help component, membership ‘is not just a matter of religion, 
but also of an institution that is perceived as privileging them and 
providing the stability they need to survive.181 
Yusuf believed that quality Islamic education allowed for women to properly 
raise the next generation. As women in Nigeria have been marginalized in their society 
nearly their entire lives, the access to education in any form provided an opportunity that 
was virtually unheard of. This access to Islamic education has been cited as a major 
contributing reason why women and girls subscribed to Yusuf’s sect of Boko Haram in 
the early 2000s.182 
Marriage into Boko Haram is a frequently utilized conduit for women to join and 
support the organization in order to gain relative security and freedom for themselves and 
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their extended families in comparison to conditions for women in general throughout 
Northern Nigeria.183 As one internally displaced young woman recalled, “when Boko 
Haram entered her town ‘some girls married the fighters willingly, some married for 
food, and some refused and were killed or beaten.’”184 By voluntarily marrying into this 
organization, these women ensure that their basic needs are taken care of. One 18-year-
old who was forcibly taken into Boko Haram explained that, “when you marry Boko 
Haram, you are free. All you have to do is clean a little.”185 In regions of harsh economic 
inequality and extreme poverty, this option is very popular. The International Crisis 
Group explains that, “In a village near Kerenowa in the Local Government Area (LGA) 
of Marte, Borno state, insurgents married 80 girls, offering dowries of 15,000 naira 
(about $70 in 2014), a considerable sum in a war-torn rural area.”186 By offering 
financial stability as well as a reliable source of food and education for its women, Boko 
Haram provides a tempting incentive for those women who are struggling in a war torn, 
repressive state. These women gain stability and security by willingly marrying into the 
organization, while Boko Haram gains women to birth and raise their children in the faith 
and to be fighters. Women who voluntarily convert to the sect and wed into the 
organization tend to be treated with more compassion and afforded more rights than those 
who are involuntarily recruited and resist forced assimilation.  
2. Involuntary Recruitment 
The second source from which Boko Haram gains female recruits is through 
involuntary means. Boko Haram still uses abductions and manipulation not only as a 
significant method of sourcing the women needed to run the day to day operations within 
camps, but as a means of holding leverage and gaining retributions against the Nigerian 
government for the detention and deaths of its militants.187 For women who live within 
towns and villages subject to Boko Haram raids, if they do not volunteer to marry into the 
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organization, are forced into either domestic or sexual slavery from which they can then 
convert and assimilate or attempt freedom and risk extreme punishment if caught. 
Women who are abducted and do not willingly convert to Islam and join the organization 
are subjected to the much harsher treatment than those who volunteer to stay and join 
ranks.  
The abduction and subsequent treatment of women and girls constitute a 
gross abuse of human rights. Human Rights Watch summarized that 
abducted women and girls who refused to convert were killed or 
‘subjected to physical and psychological abuse; forced labor; forced 
participation in military operations, including carrying ammunition or 
luring men into ambush; forced marriage to their captors; and sexual 
abuse, including rape’, in addition to the general demands placed on 
women ‘to cook, clean, and perform other household chores.188 
It would seem that in the interest of self-preservation, the best option for women 
who are abducted by Boko Haram would be to willingly convert and/or marry into the 
organization. 
Throughout its tenure, Boko Haram continues to raid and kidnap women and 
children in order to gain tactical advantage over its adversaries by using them as leverage 
and revenge. According to Amnesty International, between 2014 and 2015 alone, Boko 
Haram kidnapped at least 2,000 women and girls and either forced them into sexual 
slavery or trained them to fight.189 An International Crisis Group report from 2016 
explains that “the seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 [is] a much 
publicized spike in a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to 
hurt communities that opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as 
assets. By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivized 
combatants.”190 Boko Haram’s motivations in abducting women is not only founded in 
the tactical and strategic fight against the perceived oppressive Nigerian government, but 
also in self-service of breeding future soldiers, growth from recruitment opportunities, 
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and maintaining the everyday function of insurgency camps.191 Though the number of 
women known to belong within Boko Haram has grown exponentially in the years 
following its rebirth in 2009, it is difficult to calculate exactly how many women and 
girls have been kidnapped, how many willingly converted to the Islamic sect and how 
many joined the organization voluntarily as exact numbers are largely unknown. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Having explored the background and analysis of four FTOs, it is now possible to 
analyze the similarities and differences as well as provide recommendations for a way 
forward in combating Boko Haram. This chapter will delineate the unique characteristics 
of Boko Haram in comparison to the Chechen Rebels, the Afghan Taliban, and Al-Qaeda. 
This allows for recommendations to both the Nigerian and United States government on 
best courses of action in the fight against this FTO. 
A. ANALYSIS 
When it comes to extremist organizations, each falls onto a spectrum of influence 
with religion and religious traditions on one end and cultural norms and influences on the 
other. Though religion plays a large role in many cultures it is a separate factor that 
transcends cultural boundaries. The comparison of Boko Haram to the Chechen Black 
Widows, Al-Qaeda, and The Afghanistan Taliban ultimately shows how each of these 
organizations, falls in wildly different ranges on this scale. While all four organizations 
are religiously Islamic and fundamentalist at their core, all are vastly different in their 
beliefs on how women should be utilized within the organization and in the fight. I 
believe these differences are rooted in the culture around which the organization was 
built. In the case of the Chechen Black Widows, the Chechen culture was one that 
fostered gender equality and the organization was formed in a more “westernized” light, 
thus fostering an environment for the utilization of women in combatant roles. Whereas 
in the Afghani Taliban, women were strictly used in supportive roles until the methods 
and tactics of the Pakistani Taliban began transcending borders and the implementation 
of women into combatant roles slowly increased out of necessity. Al-Qaeda takes a more 
middle-ground approach and utilizes women in both roles. Boko Haram runs somewhere 
in the middle of the culture vs. religious spectrum as well. Boko Haram has recognized 
the shock value and international attention that combative utilization of both kidnapped 
and volunteer women would bring to its organization, as well as the necessary roles that 
women play in supporting and running its everyday survival. Clearly, Boko Haram is 
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willing to adapt to the culture and necessity of women in combative roles that it demands 
if the organization wants increased domestic and international attention and legitimacy.  
Boko Haram has developed into a modernized realm of warfare that shares 
characteristics and has developed in the like of well-established and internationally 
renowned organizations. As a result, when the international community and Nigeria in 
particular work to plan against and combat them, they must take into consideration and 
adjust to the uniqueness of the organization’s incorporation of women in particular and 
underlying issues that Boko Haram embodies in order to combat and eradicate them as a 
threat within the region. To date, the government of Nigeria has not addressed the 
underlying and well-known grievances that have fueled Boko Haram as well as utilized 
its most valuable resource—women—and thus has not taken the necessary first step in 
working towards peace for its population from this organization.  
1. Nigerian Response 
In the counterinsurgency realm, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) generated 
eight best practices that, according to McQuaid and Asfura-Heim, should be considered 
in order for a government to be successful in combatting its respective terrorism 
threats.192 McQuaid and Asfura-Heim argue that due to Boko Haram being an 
insurgency “sustained by localized grievances and conflict dynamics,”193 the starting 
point for deriving an effective response is through counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics. 
McQuaid and Asfura-Heim outline these eight tactics as follows: 
1. Devise a strategy that is built on an analytically derived conflict 
assessment 
2. Implement a coordinated whole-of-government approach 
3. Bolster government legitimacy 
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4. Protect the population 
5. Address the root causes of the conflict 
6. Attack the insurgent network 
7. Cut off support and eliminate sanctuaries 
8. Pursue opportunities to reach a settlement to the conflict194 
The Nigerian government has claimed to be taking a “soft-approach strategy” in 
building up its institutions in order to combat Boko Haram, while in reality has taken a 
heavy-handed counterterrorism approach that fails to address realities and root causes.195 
This approach is seemingly unsuccessful as McQuaid and Asfura-Heim explain that  
The conflict is also being perpetuated by the Nigerian government 
itself…[whose] approach has further alienated the already disaffected 
northeastern communities, which, for the most part, remain hesitant to 
cooperate with the security forces or provide them with the necessary 
intelligence required to pin-point, network-centric operations. Because the 
government is unable to conduct surgical strikes against the insurgents, its 
operations often result in indiscriminate killings—which expand the pool 
of potential insurgent recruits and solidify a sense that the government is 
an equally liable party to the violence. Moreover, despite an increased 
military presence in the north, the government has been unable to protect 
the population from Boko Haram attacks and retaliatory raids, and, as a 
result, has lost a great deal of credibility.196 
This heavy-handed counterterrorism approach has instilled distrust among the 
population, failed to deter Boko Haram attacks, and ignored the root grievances of the 
Nigerian people, thus making it unsuccessful to date.  
The Nigerian government has primarily worked to downplay the threat and negate 
the grievances of not only Boko Haram, but the population as a whole and has labelled its 
“soft-approach strategy” as the combative method of choice in order to appease the 
public and convince them that measures are being taken to work against Boko Haram. 
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This approach inevitably cannot work as a standalone solution in the fight to combat 
Boko Haram as it does not address the grievances of the organization and the people of 
Nigeria. There are many pathways to success in counterterrorism, but one that provides a 
comprehensive approach that addresses political, economic, and social grievances will be 
needed to defeat this threat.197 Former President of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan has on 
multiple occasions made claim that Nigeria’s conflict with Boko Haram requires 
international assistance and in May 2013 declared a state of emergency in the northern 
states of Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa as the soft-approach method was not proving to be 
making much progress.198 “In April 2014, President Jonathan’s national security advisor, 
Sambo Dasuki, published a strategy aimed at winning over the population of the north. Its 
implementation would command significant Nigerian government resources…however, 
even were it to do so, the Dasuki strategy addresses fundamental, long-term challenges 
such as inadequate education; it is not a short-term fix for Boko Haram.”199 With the 
successful election and transfer of power to current President Muhammadu Buhari in 
2015, the hope that strides will be made to encompass the eight best practices of 
counterterrorism, yet significant progress has yet to be seen with this administration.  
The CNA Analysis & Solutions Corporation created a comprehensive report in 
2015 that strategically laid out—in the context of each of the eight best practices—the 
steps that the Nigerian government would need to take in order to successfully be 
working towards eradication of the Boko Haram threat. In summation, the following 
steps must be met:  
• Boko Haram must be recognized and treated not as merely a group of 
troublemakers that can be crushed by military or pacified with money but 
a legitimate organization whose grievances must be addressed.200  
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• An overreliance of military forces will not solve the problem and cross-
governmental agencies must be built up and integrated into the fight. Only 
with this whole-of-government approach will the agencies needed to 
counter this threat not only grow stronger but have the resources needed to 
effectively counter Boko Haram.201 
• It is well established that the Nigerian government is ripe with corruption. 
Reduction of corruption is imperative and success will not be achievable 
unless addressed. Efforts should be targeted at the “complicit local 
political elites, religious leaders, military commanders, and law 
enforcement officers.”202 The public must see that this corruption is being 
combatted. By well broadcasting the accountability that these officials are 
being held to, not only will it begin to establish trust with the population 
again, but it will deter future corruption of other officials.203  
• As stated multiple times previously in this chapter, the socio-economic 
grievances of the organization must be addressed. The disparities between 
the northern and southern regions must recognized by government and 
political reform must occur in order to bolster legitimacy among the 
population.204 
• Militarily, a restructure should be considered from a counterterrorism 
approach in order to not only protect the population from future Boko 
Haram attacks but to train on posture and positioning, increased border 
security, and community relations. Emphasis should be focused towards 
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the funding, communications, recruitment, and movements of Boko 
Haram.205  
• Lastly, continued push to negotiate a settlement with the organization in 
order to mitigate violence whilst changes are being made within 
government.206  
• If the Nigerian government is serious about combatting and eradicating 
Boko Haram as a threat within both the region and internationally, these 
steps at a minimum must be addressed. The CNA’s eight steps will not be 
enough though to stop the blatant manipulation and utilization of women, 
both voluntary and involuntary to gain international and domestic 
attention and legitimacy. In order to eradicate and effectively combat 
Boko Haram, the Nigerian government must utilize one of both parties’ 
greatest assets, their women. Though unlike Boko Haram, the Nigerian 
government must trend down the path of empowerment vice martyrdom. 
Through proper education, legitimacy of institutions, and equality in 
positions of power, women are able to empower other women and 
encourage them to create reform throughout Nigeria.  
To the credit of former President Goodluck Jonathan, Boko Haram is an 
international threat and international assistance is warranted, yet this is a domestically 
grown threat and one that will not subside unless Nigeria makes major strides and 
implements legitimate political reform. This reform must be upheld long-term and must 
make all efforts to address the socio-economic grievances raised by this organization. 
The U.S. government, on the other hand, has historically, and are presently playing a 
supporting role in the context of its relationship with Nigeria. This manifests in the fight 
against Boko Haram in a broad and ever evolving way. The overarching theme of this 
governmental relationship though is that the United States will protect and maintain its 
relationship with the Nigerian government above all else, as Nigeria has one of the fastest 
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growing economies in the world and is considered an anchor state within the African 
countries.  
With his meeting in with United States in May 2018 with President Donald 
Trump, President Buhari was the first sub-Saharan African leader to visit the Oval Office 
during the Trump administration. This significant meeting was held in order to discuss 
the counterterrorism efforts that Nigeria would take in the coming years against Boko 
Haram. Within the past United States Presidential administrations, in order to support the 
Nigerian government the United States has taken a whole-of-government approach and 
has pursued an approach that focuses on democracy, military support, law enforcement, 
intelligence, development, and humanitarianism. Through promotion of this “whole-of-
government approach,” as well as providing training and equipment to government 
officials and law enforcement, and investing in programs to build up Nigerian 
infrastructure, the United States has tried to support the Nigerian government and enable 
self-help in order to combat this threat. Issues with this approach arise in the corruption 
and unwillingness to implement a “hard-approach strategy” by the Nigerian 
government.207  
2. U.S. Response 
As Boko Haram is currently posing an expanding threat to the three Nigerian 
neighbors that make up the Lake Chad region (Chad, Cameroon, and Niger), and the fact 
that the United States is allies with all three countries, it is imperative that the U.S. 
government support the eradication of this FTO. Moving forward in the fight to combat 
the Boko Haram threat within Nigeria and the surrounding Lake Chad region, the United 
States should strongly consider a few options, ones that enhance the legitimacy of socio-
economic institutions and promote equality across both economic and gender lines. In 
order for the United States to take a stronger, more active approach to combating the 
Boko Haram threat, it could essentially take one of two major paths, the same supporting 
role but with more pressure on the Nigerian government, or a containment and combative 
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approach.208 By committing to continue in a supporting role, the United States 
government must change policy in order to put more pressure on the Nigerian 
government to modify its strategy. This can be done by publicly denouncing the Nigerian 
government and openly stating failure to act against Boko Haram.209 The risk with this 
plan though as the United States government wishes to maintain good relations with the 
government and this public shaming tactic would tarnish those relations and potentially 
push the Nigerian government into a defensive position where they must maintain public 
image and the motivation would not be met meet the intended goal. This would also pose 
to be a counterproductive course of action for the United States in terms of minimizing 
the manipulation of women within the Boko Haram organization. By internationally 
denouncing the Nigerian government and opening the door for strained relations, the U.S. 
government would lose any credibility and chance of influencing the growth of political, 
social, and economic institutions.  
The U.S. government could also impose sanctions on exports and against 
Nigerian government officials who have been known to profit from this conflict and who 
are not actively working towards a comprehensive solution to the threat. As well, a 
position that since Boko Haram is an international threat, business is not to be conducted 
with Nigerian companies and officials as it poses a threat to national security.210 This 
approach is strong, a hard line, very confrontational, and poses a great risk to the relations 
between nations. With Nigeria being an anchor state within Africa and one of the United 
States most important relationships within the region, it is vital that care and finesse be 
taken when formulating a plan. This course of action increases the risk of abducted 
women being used as pawns by Boko Haram. With historical patterns under 
consideration, the likelihood that Boko Haram will retaliate when hard lines are drawn 
against those that support their efforts is high. Retaliation with this organization has 
historically been the kidnapping of women for ransom or integration into the 
                                                 
208 McQuaid and Asfura-Heim, 39–48. 
209 McQuaid and Asfura-Heim, 39. 
210 McQuaid and Asfura-Heim, 41. 
 63 
organization, which is counterproductive to the end goal of minimizing female 
utilization. 
Lastly, the final avenue for the United States to take in order to maintain a non-
combative role with the threat of Boko Haram is the manipulation of foreign aid could be 
used as a pawn to pressure the Nigerian government to comply with a whole-of-
government approach. The risk to this approach is that by penalizing the government, you 
are penalizing the population as a whole. In a country so riddled with economic 
inequality and poverty, by taking away foreign aid going towards critical institutions the 
United States government not only undermines the long-term development goals that it is 
working to achieve, but it undermines its reputation within institutions that don’t play a 
role in countering the threat against Boko Haram.  
The other option for the United States is to adopt a containment and combative 
approach, as the Nigerian government has not been executing adequate 
counterinsurgency measures to quell the threat.211 It is not unfeasible that a containment 
approach be addressed and implemented by the United States to prevent the spread of 
Boko Haram outside of Nigeria. This approach would quell Boko Haram in the interim 
from taking control of Nigeria’s neighboring countries, which would pose a significant 
security threat to Africa as a whole while maintaining a long-term goal of addressing the 
underlying issues that the organization demands Nigeria address. “If Boko Haram’s 
momentum is not reversed, it could have serious consequences for the future of the 
region, and ultimately one day potentially pose a direct threat to the United States and its 
interests. A regional containment approach can thus be seen as preventative, with the aim 
of avoiding a scenario in which Boko Haram directly targets the United States.”212 
Though the approach may leave addressing the source of Boko Haram until later date, 
maintaining control in surrounding countries would have significant strategic appeal in 
the long run. Without addressing the root grievances of the organization, this course of 
action fails to facilitate the desperately needed strong, fair, and legitimate institutions that 
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will facilitate equal opportunities for both men and women within government. These 
institutions are desperately needed in order to make strides in empowering women to be 
more active in their government vice opposing it. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Not only has Boko Haram adapted to a higher female representation within the 
combative ranks, but it was founded upon and gained domestic legitimacy based on 
Yusuf’s preaching’s of female inequality within Nigeria and the need for increased 
education. Women have been integrated into the building blocks of Boko Haram since its 
formation, but only when it reformed in 2009 did they become engrained in the 
combative side. Moving forward in the international fight against Boko Haram, tactics 
such as those outlined by the CNA must be analyzed and adapted in order to plan a 
unique attack against Boko Haram. Underlying issues must be addressed, the threat must 
be contained to the Nigerian borders, and the international community must put an end to 
the fetishization and global outcry of women in combat so as not to feed into their 
utilization within terrorist organizations. It is only through legitimate restructuring of the 
Nigerian government in order to minimize corruption and address the major underlying 
grievances through strong institutions that empower Nigerian women with equality and 
education Boko Haram has a chance of being quelled. Until that day, one person’s 
terrorist will continue to be another person’s freedom fighter, and the organization will 
grow in strength, numbers, and legitimacy. Meanwhile, women’s involvement, both 
voluntary and involuntary will become increasingly prevalent, and the presence and 
legitimacy of Boko Haram among the international community will continue to grow. 
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